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This paper applies the economic theory of regulation to laws for-
bidding discrimination or requiring affirmative action. Perfect
competition causes discriminators to pay for segregation. Market
failures can shift the cost of discrimination to its victims. The
most efficient remedies are the ones already developed by econo-
mists for other problems. Discriminatory cartels can be prohibited
or undermined. Discriminatory signals can be overcome by supple-
menting market information. External effects of prejudice can be
internalized by tax-subsidies. In general, any target for diversity
can be achieved more efficiently by transferable rights than by
quotas.
I was much cheered, on my arrival [at prison], by the warder at the gate,
who had to take particulars about me. He asked my religion and I replied
"agnostic." He asked how to spell it, and remarked with a sigh: "Well,
there are many religions, but I suppose they all worship the same God."
Bertrand Russell'
In response to a report on affirmative action, President David
Gardner of the University of California quipped, "If you think you
know the solution, you don't understand the problem."2 People with
a solution are like Bertrand Russell's warder - they underestimate
the depth of the disagreement. Intellectuals cannot resolve disputes
that are deeper than ideas, but economists can improve the debate
* Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, School of Law, University of California at Berke-
ley since 1980. Oxford Ph.D. 1975, Harvard; B.A. 1967, Swarthmore.
1. 2 BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL 1914-
1944, at 30 (1968). The passage occurs when Russell is beginning his brief confinement
in prison for opposing World War I.
2. Former President Gardner made this remark in response to a presentation of the
affirmative action plan of the Berkeley campus to the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia. I thank Michael Heyman, who witnessed the event, for confirming the facts.
by identifying the most efficient means for pursuing any particular
policy.
The laws that forbid discrimination and promote affirmative action
regulate product and labor markets. Economics has developed an ex-
tensive critique of regulation. According to this critique, market-like
instruments should replace bureaucratic rules wherever possible.
Substituting the former for the latter promotes efficiency and liberty
by lowering the cost and coercion of achieving policy goals. This Ar-
ticle applies the economic critique of regulation to antidiscrimination
law and explores the possibility of substituting market affirmative
action for bureaucratic rules. The Article concludes that substitution
would increase efficiency and liberty, and also dilute the law's sym-
bolic condemnation of discrimination. Unfortunately, economic anal-
ysis has no theory of the symbolic and education function of law.
I. ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF REGULATION
A policy science predicts the effect of alternative policies on
shared values.3 For example, applied economics predicts how alter-
native policies affect efficiency and distribution. Most political dis-
agreements are buttressed by false beliefs about how policies
impinge upon values. By correcting such errors, science improves the
quality of policy debate or even imposes a framework upon it.
Economists reached a consensus in the 1970s concerning the
framework for analyzing government regulations. According to this
framework, a prima facie case for regulation requires demonstrating
a market failure and a policy to correct it. Tests for market failure
are developed in general equilibrium theory; corrective policies are
evaluated by cost-benefit techniques. A conclusive case for regulation
requires a further demonstration that the proposed remedy would
succeed politically, rather than being subverted by interest groups.
Tests for political failure are developed in collective choice theory.4
This consensus over the framework of debate obviously did not
end disagreements among economists over regulation. Left-liberal
economists stress market failures, and conservative economists stress
political failures. However, the arguments between the two sides join
because they proceed within the same general framework. The join-
ing of the arguments focuses research on questions that both sides
consider decisive.
3. See Robert Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989).
4. This framework for evaluating regulation is reflected in many books and arti-
cles. See, e.g., STEVEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); CHARLES L.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975).
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Two examples, which are especially relevant to this article, illus-
trate the effect of economics on the debate about regulation. First,
George Stigler published an article in 1964 purporting to show that
federal securities laws do not increase the value of stocks.' He con-
cluded by advocating repeal of the federal securities laws and aboli-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although his
recommendations were not adopted, his paper helped to shift the de-
bate about securities laws, which is now conducted in academic cir-
cles in terms of the "efficient market hypothesis."6
As a second example, Charles Schultze proposed to replace "com-
mand and control" regulations with "market-like instruments.", To
illustrate the distinction, the state can reduce air pollution by impos-
ing quantitative restrictions on polluters ("commands backed by
sanctions") or by creating a limited number of transferrable emis-
sion rights ("markets in emissions"). The environmental lobby ini-
tially defended quantitative restrictions and opposed markets, using
arguments that relied upon moral intuition. ("Why should you pay
someone to stop dumping garbage in your back yard?") More re-
cently, however, environmental organizations like the Sierra Club
and the Environmental Defense Fund have come to appreciate that
voters will "buy" cleaner air if it costs less. The search by environ-
mentalists for cheaper solutions to pollution encompasses innovative
proposals like markets in emission rights, which were given a statu-
tory foundation in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.'
As these examples suggest, most economists agreed in the 1970s
and 1980s that government officials were retarding the economy with
5. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus.
GRADUATE SCH. Bus. U. CHI. 117 (1964), reprinted in STIGLER, supra note 4, at 78.
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Ronald J. Gilson
& Renier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984).
7. SCHULTZE, supra note 4.
8. The law has actually evolved from set-offs within a single existing plant, to the
broader and more systematic trading envisioned in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West Supp. 1994); see RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR
POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING (1980); RICHARD A. LIROFF,
REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE
(1986); THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
POLLUTION POLICY (1985); John P. Dwyer, California's Tradable Emissions Policy and
Greenhouse Gas Control, 118 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 59 (1992); Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation" A New Era From an Old
Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991).
heavy-handed regulations. While agreeing about the necessity of re-
form, economists disagreed over its direction and scope. Thus,
George Stigler wanted to repeal most regulations and Charles
Schultze wanted to improve them.9 The diversity of views among
economists provided intellectual sanction for reforming politicians
who repealed some regulations and reformed others. However, few
economists found anything good to say about "command and con-
trol" regulations.
Contrary to these trends, legislatures, courts, and administrators
have imposed new "command and control" regulations since 1964
for the stated purpose of eliminating current discrimination or undo-
ing its past effects upon various social groups, including racial mi-
norities, women, the elderly, and handicapped people.10 These
regulations apply to hiring and promoting ("employment discrimina-
tion"), and the sale of goods and services ("refusal to deal"). Al-
though complex and uncertain in application, the effect of the laws
are far-reaching. New rights have been created for employees, job
applicants, and consumers. Many organizations have adopted targets
for the social mix of employees and implemented procedures to han-
dle disputes and complaints.
Various scholars have applied the economic theory of regulation to
these laws and policies, but none has achieved the comprehensiveness
of Richard Epstein's Forbidden Grounds." This technical yet pas-
sionate book calls for legislatures to repeal all statutes suppressing
discrimination in economic transactions and abandon the field to
common law. Thus, Epstein's prescription for antidiscrimination laws
parallels Stigler's prescription for securities laws. Against Epstein,
John Donohue has argued that Title VII probably increased eco-
nomic efficiency on the whole. 2
As good as Epstein's book is - and it is very good - its policy
prescription is more prophetic than practical, because it cannot suc-
ceed in the U.S. without an unforeseeable change in the distribution
of political sentiment and power. Furthermore, Epstein's book poses
the risk of identifying the economic theory of regulation exclusively
with abolition, in which case the defenders of antidiscrimination laws
9. See SCHULTZE, supra note 4; STIGLER, supra note 4.
10. Richard Epstein's book is the most thorough treatment of the legislation.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAWS (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].
11. Id.
12. The efficiency of Title VII is debated by Richard Posner and John Donohue.
E.g., John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legisla-
tion: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987) [hereinafter Further
Thoughts]; John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986)
[hereinafter Is Title VII Efficient?]; Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of
Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987).
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and affirmative action policies will feel compelled to oppose econom-
ics. This would be unfortunate in my view because economics has
much to offer both sides in the policy debate over discrimination. To
become more widely accepted in this debate, economics must be
viewed as a flexible engine of analysis that can serve various political
tendencies.
This Article contributes to this goal in two ways. First, I develop
the simple, pure economic theory of regulation as applied to discrim-
ination in economic transactions. Second, I develop the general lines
of the case for reform, which involves replacing command and con-
trol regulations with market-like instruments to overcome discrimi-
nation and pursue affirmative action targets. (Hence the phrase
"market affirmative action.")
II. DISCRIMINATION As INEFFICIENCY
To discriminate among wines by taste, smell, and color displays
refinement, but to discriminate against people by race, sex, religion,
ethnicity, age, or disability may violate morality and law.13 In the
United States and other countries, law restricts the criteria that can
be used when employers fill jobs, universities award scholarships, or
retailers sell commodities. Fairness in competition requires that the
criteria for sorting winners from losers measure performance on
dimensions relevant to the activity in question, such as speed, accu-
racy, comprehension, endurance, and originality.' 4 Performance is
not measured by traits of persons such as race, gender, ethnicity, or
age. Antidiscrimination laws prohibit the unfairness of sorting win-
ners from losers by traits rather than performance. The absence of
discrimination gives everyone an equal opportunity to compete for
offices, jobs, commodities, privileges, and honors, regardless of their
personal traits.
Performance in economic life is usually measured by productivity.
Consequently, discrimination in economic life usually consists in
sorting people according to traits rather than productivity. When
13. For an illuminating discussion of when and why discrimination is morally
wrong, see Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1992). For an interna-
tional collection of essays on discrimination and the law, see DISCRIMINATION: THE Lim-
ITS OF LAW (Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds., 1992).
14. See, for example, Rawl's discussion of "pure procedural justice" in JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90, 86 (1971).
people are sorted by traits rather than productivity, industrial effi-
ciency diminishes. Consequently, discrimination as defined here nec-
essarily reduces efficiency in production. Conversely, non-
discrimination maximizes the productivity of organizations.
"Discrimination" is a term of opprobrium in ordinary speech.
Most practices that satisfy the efficiency definition of discrimination
are widely condemned. To illustrate, "ceiling quotas" on Jews, which
lowered the productivity of universities, are widely condemned. How-
ever, the efficiency definition of discrimination admits the possibility
that some practices falling within its scope may be widely condoned.
To illustrate, the exclusion of non-Indians from jobs in tribal govern-
ment on Indian reservations is widely condoned.
Organizations mix people by traits in various ratios, with some
organizations being relatively homogeneous and others being rela-
tively heterogeneous. As defined above, discrimination occurs when
mixing in an organization does not go far enough to maximize pro-
duction. People who are willing to sacrifice productivity and lose in-
come in order to reduce mixing have "a taste for separation."
Economists often take the satisfaction of preferences as the appropri-
ate goal of public policy. However, there is much dispute about
whether satisfying the taste of people for separation is an appropri-
ate policy goal.
Equal opportunity to compete in economic transactions conflicts
with freedom of contract. Complete freedom of contract implies the
right to deal or not to deal with anyone for whatever reason, includ-
ing their personal traits. In contrast, antidiscrimination laws attempt
to prohibit certain motives from affecting economic transactions. An-
tidiscrimination laws necessarily interfere with freedom of con-
tract.15 In general, liberty rights conflict with equality rights,
because the former create a sphere of individual autonomy and the
latter intrude into it.16
15. Their enactment, however, does not necessarily logically imply a much wider
infringement demanded by some proponents. Equal opportunity to compete does not im-
ply an equal probability of winning, since the probability of winning a fair competition
increases with the contestant's skill. Equal opportunity does not imply equal outcomes,
since some win and others lose in any competition. Equal opportunity does not imply
distributive justice, since a fair competition may not distribute outcomes ideally. Equal
opportunity does not imply that the most deserving person wins, since natural abilities
and luck affect performance on any occasion.
16. There is a large philosophical literature on "negative liberty" and "positive
liberty." See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, Liberal Rights: Two Sides of the Coin, in LIB-
ERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 1 (1993).
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III. SEPARATION AND MIXING IN PERFECT COMPETITION
In this section I review how competition in markets with free con-
tracts undermines discrimination and determines the extent of sepa-
ration, segregation, and diversity. I begin by reviewing how
competition undermines discrimination.17 In general, people who
have a particular preference bear the cost of satisfying it in a per-
fectly competitive economy. Consequently, competition causes people
who prefer segregation to bear any additional cost that discrimina-
tion imposes on goods, services, or employment.
To see why, first consider labor markets. Discriminatory employ-
ers constrain themselves by refusing to hire or promote people with
disfavored traits. The constraint imposes higher costs to obtain the
same quality of labor. In perfect competition, lower cost producers
eliminate higher cost producers. Thus, perfect competition eliminates
discrimination by employers.
To illustrate, a professional football team, which will go unnamed,
recruited the best available white players in the 1950s, but refused to
recruit blacks. This discriminatory team competed against other
teams that recruited the best available players regardless of race.
Over time, the discriminatory team's popularity and profits plum-
meted as it lost more and more of its games, so it eventually aban-
doned discriminatory recruitment.
Now consider how competition affects discriminatory employees,
as opposed to discriminatory employers. Imagine a world whose peo-
ple are blue or green, in which some blues refuse to work with
greens, but otherwise people are nondiscriminatory. Workers of dif-
ferent color substitute perfectly for each other on the job, except that
organizations employing discriminatory blues must pay the extra
cost of segregating them from greens. Thus, the value of a discrimi-
natory worker to an employer equals the value of any nondiscrimina-
tory worker minus the incremental cost of segregation. Competition
in the labor market aligns each worker's wages with his value to
employers. The perfectly competitive wage of discriminatory workers
thus equals the wage of equivalent workers minus the incremental
cost of segregation. In general, perfect labor market competition im-
poses the cost of segregation upon workers who demand it.
These facts are depicted in Figure 1. The horizontal axis indicates
the quantity of labor and the vertical axis indicates the wage rate.
Workers are distinguished into those who discriminate, indicated by
17. See GARY S. BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
a subscript, d, and those who do not discriminate, indicated by a
subscript, n. The curves Sd and Sn indicate the quantity of labor
each group will supply as a function of the wage. The demand curves
Dd and Dn indicate the value of the two kinds of labor to employers.
Initially, assume that the cost of segregation is nil, so both kinds of
labor are equally valuable to employers and they receive the same
wage, Wd=w n.Now assume that segregating the workplace becomes
costly. As the cost of segregation increases, the demand curve for
discriminatory labor shifts down from Dd to D'd as shown, and the
discriminatory wage falls from wd to w'd. The reduction in use of
discriminatory labor causes an increase in demand for nondiscrimi-
natory labor, as indicated by the upward shift in demand from Dn to
D' n. Consequently, a gap opens in the wage of the two groups, with
discriminatory labor receiving the lower wage w'd and nondiscrimi-
natory labor receiving the higher wage w'n.
Fig 1: Discriminatory Employees
Discriminatory Non-Discriminatory
$ $




I have explained why perfect competition causes discriminatory
workers to pay for segregation. In general, perfect labor markets im-
pose an increase in the cost of production upon anyone whose de-
mand for special working conditions causes it. Consequently, perfect
labor markets would also impose the cost of additional integration
upon workers who demand more of it than would maximize the
firm's productivity.
Now I turn from labor markets to markets for goods and services.
A similar argument can be made about the refusal to deal as was
made about employment discrimination. First consider discrimina-
tory sellers and nondiscriminatory buyers. If sellers refuse to deal
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with some buyers, the discriminatory sellers may experience addi-
tional costs. In perfect competition, all goods sell at cost, so discrimi-
natory sellers will charge more than nondiscriminatory sellers for the
same good. Nondiscriminatory buyers will purchase from the sellers
with the lowest prices. Thus, perfect competition eliminates discrimi-
natory sellers, just as it eliminates discriminatory employers. For ex-
ample, a restauranteur who insisted on segregated dining facilities
might have higher costs, which nondiscriminatory patrons would re-
fuse to bear.
Now consider the case of discriminatory buyers. Once again, prod-
uct markets strictly parallel labor markets. Specifically, consumers
who prefer discriminatory sellers will pay a surcharge for the prod-
ucts they buy relative to nondiscriminatory consumers. The
surcharge will equal the additional cost of segregating buyers. For
example, diners who discriminate will pay the extra cost of segregat-
ing their facilities.18
I have explained that people who demand segregation pay the cost
of it in competitive markets. In turn, demand for segregation conveys
differential advantage to various groups in the labor market. To il-
lustrate, airlines apparently believe that a significant group of their
customers prefer to be served by pretty, young stewardesses. An air-
line that caters to this taste may dismiss stewardesses as they reach
middle age, thus incurring higher labor turnover and training costs.
These higher costs will be paid by passengers in the form of higher
ticket prices. However, discriminatory demand will also bid up the
wage for pretty, young stewardesses, who will thus benefit from pas-
senger discrimination. 19
IV. DIVERSITY AMONG ORGANIZATIONS AND IN ORGANIZATIONS
So far I have discussed discrimination in markets for labor, goods,
and services. Exchange occurs in markets, and production occurs in
18. A related question is whether the satisfaction of discriminatory preferences
should ever count as a social benefit. Some economists, who are true to the tradition of
Bentham, count all preference satisfaction as equally valuable, regardless of whether the
preferences are immoral; but others disagree. For discussion and citations, see Jeff L.
Lewin & William N. Trumbull, The Social Value of Crimes, 10 INT. REV. L. ECON. 271
(1990).
19. United States courts have held that customer preferences cannot justify dis-
crimination in favor of young women in the hiring of airplane stewardesses. E.g., Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Diaz, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971). In Diaz, males alleged that Pan American World Airways discriminated in
hiring airline staff. The court held that discriminatory preferences of customers could not
justify discrimination in hiring airline staff.
organizations. Now I consider the extent to which people from di-
verse social groups will obtain advantages from mixing together in
organizations.
Economic organizations join people together in a structure of roles
and personal relationships to produce goods and services. Performing
the necessary roles requires cooperation, and motivating the individ-
uals who fill them requires competition.2 0 When combining coopera-
tion and competition, disputes often arise over distributional issues
like advancement and wages. When people in the organization share
the same outlook, disputes are easier to avoid or resolve, and, as a
result, the costs of decision making are lower.21 Furthermore, clus-
tering people together who have the same tastes increases efficiency
in the supply of public goods. To illustrate, achieving a consensus on
interior decorating in the workplace is easier and cheaper to imple-
ment if all the workers like bright colors and clean edges.2 Thus,
efficient governance and the supply of public goods to the workplace
argue for clustering workers into homogeneous groups.
However, combining people with different outlooks in the same or-
ganization also has advantages. The division of labor causes people
to view the production process from different perspectives. People
with different perspectives tend to notice things that would be missed
by people with the same perspective. Greater perceptiveness in-
creases an organization's flexibility and adaptability. Thus, heteroge-
neity, which increases the cost of decision making, may improve its
quality.23
The competition between homogeneous and diverse firms is exem-
plified by the competition between American and Japanese corpora-
tions. Large American corporations often have an ethnically diverse
board of directors, which gives Americans an advantage in interna-
tional business networks. In contrast, large Japanese corporations
have homogeneous boards of directors, which lowers the transaction
costs of governance. International competition is now testing which
20. This insight is fundamental to the "new industrial organization," which con-
ceives of the firm as a principal-agent problem. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE. THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
21. Henry Hansmann found that cooperatives tend to succeed when their members
are homogeneous so that decision costs remain low. See Henry Hansmann, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democ-
racy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990).
22. In a famous article, Charles Tiebout argued that mobility would naturally
cause people to separate into local jurisdictions in which the residents have similar tastes
with respect to public goods, thus increasing efficiency in the supply of public goods. In
effect, I am arguing that this conclusion also applies to the workplace. See Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see also
WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972).
23. This insight is formalized in propositions like this: If individuals observe a vari-
able with error, and the error is normally distributed with zero mean, then the best pre-
dictor of the true value of the variable is the mean of the individual observations.
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kind of corporation is more efficient.
I have described a few of the advantages and disadvantages of
homogeneity and heterogeneity in organizations. The reader can
probably think of many more. Organizations that compete in the
marketplace try to combine persons and practices in the most profit-
able way, and the resulting mix defines the firm's "culture." In com-
petition, firms with successful corporate cultures multiply and
unsuccessful ones disappear.
It is conceivable that one type of corporate culture would be so
successful as to eliminate all the others in a fair competition, thus
leaving all firms with the same mix of persons and practices. How-
ever, this outcome seems as unlikely in economic competition as in
biological evolution. At any point in time, we expect competing firms
to vary significantly from each other in corporate culture, including
the way they mix social groups. In other words, we expect diversity
among organizations with respect to diversity within organizations.
Most citizens of a large country like the United States feel the
need for institutions and identities that occupy an intermediate posi-
tion between the state and the individual. Important parochial at-
tachments include community, region, race, ethnicity, and religion.
Intermediate organizations such as residential communities,
churches, and private clubs are seldom representative of the nation
as a whole with respect to measures of diversity applied in discrimi-
nation cases. In the case of Indian reservations, restricting residence
and employment to tribal members increases ethnic homogeneity.24
Few people would advocate the enforcement of centrally determined
targets for diversity upon these intermediate institutions.
Diversity among organizations can arise from separation or segre-
gation. Indeed, distinguishing one from the other is difficult philo-
sophically and practically.25 When perfect competition imposes the
24. To illustrate, the Vice Chairman of the Pasqua Yaqui tribe told me in the
summer of 1991 that his greatest concern was to get Yaqui children out of integrated
classrooms.
25. For an intelligent discussion of this problem by an economic historian, see JEN-
NIFER A. ROBACK, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: GROUP IDENTITY AND VOLUNTARY INTEGRA-
TION . 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 60. Roback writes:
How integrated should society be? To answer this question, two prior questions
must be addressed. First, what function do ethnic groups perform for their
members? This question focuses on the benefits of ethnic identity: distinctive-
ness and separateness. Second, why do we want ethnic integration? This ques-
tion focuses on the benefits of ethnic interaction: mixing and transformation.
Id. at 60. Roback goes on to ask how to determine the appropriate rate at which to trade
off ethnic identity and group solidarity against ethnic integration and social cohesion.
Her answer is that government, which cannot get the price of tangible commodities right,
cost of separation or segregation upon the parties who demand it, the
case for interference by the state is weak. The strong case for state
regulation arises when market failures enable the people who de-
mand segregation or separation to transfer their cost to others.
Before turning to market failures, however, I consider the possibility
that the state might want to alter the level of mixing under perfect
competition. If the state intervenes, it should pursue its policy goal
efficiently, which leads to the next topic.
V. PROMOTING MIXING By TARGETS, TAXES AND TRANSFERABLE
RIGHTS
Many markets are "workably competitive," which means that
they function much like the ideal type of a perfectly competitive
market. Suppose that politicians and policy makers wish to achieve
more mixing than workable competition yields, or to achieve it very
quickly." One way to pursue such a goal is by imposing "targets" or
"quotas" on organizations. "Quotas" are apparently unconstitutional
in U.S. law and "targets" are apparently constitutional,27 although
the difference between them is elusive. 8 Fortunately, this difficult
distinction is unimportant for the purposes of this paper. Instead of
contrasting targets and quotas, I will contrast non-transferable
targets and transferable targets."9
What happens under workable competition if government imposes
targets upon all organizations in order to achieve uniform mixing?
For example, what happens if government requires fifty percent of
the workers in each organization to be male and fifty percent to be
female? Like any quota system, employment targets are insensitive
to underlying differences in costs, which causes inefficiencies.
To depict this fact, Figure 2 shows average production costs on the
vertical axis and the proportion of female workers on the horizontal
axis for two hypothetical firms in different industries. According to
the figure, production costs are minimized in Firm A when thirty
percent of its workers are female, and production costs are mini-
mized in Firm B when forty percent of its workers are female. Thus,
cannot possibly get this trade-off right. So, government should remain neutral towards
race. Id. at 61, 78-80.
26. John Donohue argues that perfect competition might take too long to eliminate
discriminatory practices. See Further Thoughts, supra note 12; Is Title VII Efficient?,
supra note 12.
27. In the Bakke case, Justice Powell held that racial or ethnic targets to achieve
diversity are permitted in an educational institution, but quotas are unconstitutional. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
29. On market affirmative action, see generally Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the
Market Place, 43 N.C. L. REv. 271 (1965); Jerry L. Mashaw, Implementing Quotas, 79
GEo. L.J. 1769 (1991).
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in perfect competition without regulation, the proportion of female
workers in Firms A and B will equal thirty and forty percent, respec-
tively. To be concrete, the proportion of women graduating from
American law schools is higher than Ph.D. programs in economics,
so Firm B might be a law firm, which can attract female lawyers
easily, and Firm A might be an economic forecasting firm, which has
difficulty attracting female economists.






0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of Female Workers
Now suppose that government wants to increase female employ-
ment in the two firms to fifty percent. One way to do so is by impos-
ing a fifty percent target on both firms. However, replacing male
with female workers may cost one firm more than the other. Alterna-
tively, the policy goal could be fifty percent female employment on
average over the two firms. Implementing this goal at least cost
might require one firm to have more than fifty percent female work-
ers and the other to have less.
The two approaches are contrasted by extending the previous ex-
ample. To keep the numbers simple, assume that each firm employs
one hundred people. Thus, Firm A employs thirty women and Firm
B employs forty women in the initial situation without regulation, for
total employment of seventy women. The government's target re-
quires female employment of one hundred, or an increase in female
employment of thirty. The horizontal axis in Figure 3 measures the
increase in female employment in Firm A from left to right, and the
increase in Firm B is measured from right to left. At the extreme
left, Firm A replaces zero males with females and Firm B replaces
thirty males with females. At the extreme right, the opposite applies
- Firm A adds thirty females and Firm B adds zero females. Con-
sequently, each point on the horizontal axis represents a different
way of distributing an increase of thirty in total female employment
between the two firms.
Fig 3: Distributing Additional
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Figure 3 permits a direct comparison between uniform and cost-
minimizing targets. According to the figure, the cost-minimizing way
to distribute the increase of thirty female workers between the two
firms is indicated by the intersection of the two cost curves, which is
the point where the marginal cost of adding an additional female
worker is the same for both firms. At the cost minimizing point,
Firm A replaces five male workers with females, and Firm B re-
places twenty-five male workers with females. Thus, the minimal
cost of adding thirty additional female workers is indicated by the
areas I+II+III in Figure 3.
However, if a uniform target is imposed, Firm A must increase its
female employment by twenty and Firm B must increase its female
employment by ten, even though Firm B can replace male with fe-
male employees at a lower marginal cost than Firm A. The total cost
of adding thirty additional female workers by uniform targets is
I-+II+III+IV. Compared to the minimum cost approach, targets
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achieve the goal of adding thirty female workers at extra cost corre-
sponding to area IV.
Ideally, government administrators would respond to differences in
labor markets by adjusting the targets to take account of the pool of
qualified workers and other labor market conditions.30 For example,
the female target for Firm B would be higher than for Firm A to
reflect the greater number of women in law as opposed to economics.
However, the economic critique of regulation builds upon the insight
that the best regulations for society are seldom best for the regula-
tors, and even officials who have incentives to impose the best regula-
tions seldom have enough information. To illustrate, officials might
impose fifty percent targets on each firm because doing so maximizes
the need for regulators, or because the officials lack the necessary
information to adjust the targets in response to conditions in local
labor markets.
In contrast, "market-like instruments" of regulation economize on
the amount of information that officials require to enforce them. In
terms of Figure 3, market-like regulation will induce Firm A to add
five female workers and Firm B to add twenty-five. The mechanisms
that can achieve this goal include targets supported by tax-subsidies
or transferable employment rights. I will explain both of them, with-
out discussing the formidable practical obstacles to their adoption.
The tax-subsidy solution requires each firm to pay a tax on "ex-
cess" workers of the disfavored type and receive a subsidy for "sur-
plus" workers of the favored type. To illustrate by our previous
example, assume that policy makers adopt the. target of fifty percent
female workers in the combined professions of law and economics.
Each firm would receive a target of fifty percent females in its work
force in these professions. A firm that fell short of the target would
be charged a tax on its excess male workers, and a firm that ex-
ceeded the target would receive a subsidy for its surplus female
workers. For example, if Firm A is an economic forecasting com-
pany that employs one hundred economists and thirty of them are
female, then it must pay a tax on its twenty "excess" male econo-
mists. If the tax is high enough, Firm A will respond by replacing
male economists with females. In general, the higher the tax-subsidy,
the more male employees will be replaced with females. It is not
30. For example, the University of California at Berkeley sets employment targets
for faculty hiring in each department based upon the pool of qualified graduates in the
field. Thus, the law school has higher targets for women than the economics department.
hard to see that a tax-subsidy rate exists, and can be identified eas-
ily, which achieves any target for increased female employment at
the least cost to society.
To illustrate, return to the example in which the goal is adding
thirty female workers in Firms A and B, and each firm is assigned a
target of fifty percent female employees in professional jobs. The tax
must be paid on shortfalls relative to the target, and the subsidy will
be received for surpluses relative to the target. Initially the tax-sub-
sidy is set at a low level and gradually raised until the goal of thirty
additional female workers is achieved. Figure 3 indicates that this
goal will be achieved by setting the tax-subsidy at p*.
To see why, consider the response of Firm A and Firm B when the
tax-subsidy equals p*. If the tax is set at p*, Firm A will prefer to
add up to five female workers to avoid paying the tax. However, af-
ter it adds five female workers, it is cheaper to pay the tax than to
add more females. Consequently, after adding five females, Firm A
will pay a tax on the remaining fifteen "excess" male employees, for
total tax payments of 15p*. Similarly, Firm B will add ten additional
females to achieve its target and avoid paying the tax. However,
Firm B will then take advantage of the subsidy by hiring additional
females out to the point where the additional cost equals the subsidy,
which occurs when Firm B adds a total of twenty-five females. Thus,
Firm B will receive a subsidy of p* on its fifteen "surplus" female
employees, for a total subsidy of 15 p*. Notice that in equilibrium
the total taxes paid by Firm A equal the total subsidies enjoyed by
Firm B.
An alternative policy that achieves the same results in principle is
to create a transferable right to employ disfavored workers.31 Firms
would be required by law to own as many legal rights as they employ
workers of the disfavored type. To illustrate by our previous exam-
ple, assume that policy makers adopt the target of fifty percent fe-
male workers in the combined professions of law and economics.
Thus, the regulators must create a total number of rights to employ
male lawyers or economists equal to fifty percent of the current
workers in those jobs. These rights must be allocated initially, say by
gift or auction. It matters little from an efficiency perspective how
they are initially allocated. Once allocated, firms would buy and sell
the rights.
31. In a bitter satire, Derrick Bell imagines the effects of a government bill author-
izing whites to purchase permits allowing them to discriminate against blacks in busi-
ness. The purpose served by the imagined permits is to allow for the satisfaction of
discriminatory preferences at a price. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47-64 (1992). Jerry Mashaw contemplates a mar-
ket to discriminate, analogous to a market to pollute. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Against
First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 231-37 (1994); Mashaw, supra note 29.
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To illustrate concretely, suppose that regulators initially give Firm
A and Firm B male employment rights equal to fifty percent of their
workers. Thus, each firm receives the right to employ fifty males, for
a total of one hundred males. However, the two firms initially em-
ploy 130 males combined. To comply with the law, the two firms
must now replace thirty male workers with females. The firms will
bargain with each other to try to accomplish this goal in the cheap-
est way. If bargaining replicates a competitive market, Firm A will
offer to pay p* to Firm B for each male employment right. Firm B
will respond by selling the right to employ fifteen males to Firm A.
So in equilibrium, Firm A will increase its female workers by five
and purchase fifteen male employment rights from Firm B, whereas
Firm B will increase its female workers by twenty-five and sell fif-
teen male employment rights to Firm A.
Notice that tax-subsidies and transferable employment rights
achieve the identical outcome. Specifically, Firm A increases female
employment by five, Firm B increases female employment by
twenty-five, and Firm A pays 15p* to Firm B."2
Apparently, a tax-subsidy scheme is in place in Germany with re-
spect to employment of the handicapped. Employers are assigned a
target for hiring disabled workers based upon the proportion of
handicapped in the working population. Employers who fail to hire
their target of the handicapped make payments to the government
which passes the funds along to employers who hire more than their
share.33 New Jersey has experimented with a similar approach to
low income housing located in middle class communities.3 4
VI. DISCRIMINATORY POWER
I have discussed discrimination in markets with perfect competi-
tion and the achievement of affirmative action targets in perfectly
competitive labor markets. Although the perfectly competitive model
32. The difference between tax-subsidies and marketable rights is the difference in
transactions costs and whether the officials adjust prices or quantities to converge to the
equilibrium. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1982).
33. See Mashaw, supra note 31, at 236 (citing BERND FRICK, INTERNE ARBEIT-
SMARKTE UND BETREIBLICHE SCHWERBEHINDERTERBHAFTIGUNG: THEORETISCHE
ANALYSEN UND EMPIRISCHE BEFUNDE (1992)); Martin Pfaff & Walter Huber, Disability
Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD DISABLED
WORKERS: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSES OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS 193 (Robert H. Have-
man et al. eds., 1984).
34. Suburban communities can buy their way out of half of their low income hous-
ing obligations. See Jeff Rubin et al., Affordable Housing & Municipal Choices, 66
LAND ECON. 325 (1990).
describes powerful forces at work in the economy, part of the histori-
cal differences in wages between blacks and whites, or between
women and men, are usually attributed to discrimination. Rather
than confirming the prediction that discriminators paid for it, empir-
ical studies suggest that the targets of discrimination in the United
States historically received lower wages than others with equivalent
skills, and that civil rights laws helped raise the income of blacks.36
Given the evidence, discriminatory practices in this country cannot
be explained fully by the model of perfect competition.3
In subsequent sections of this Article, I will consider several mar-
ket failures that might explain how discriminators shift the burden
of segregation to its victims. First I develop a model of discrimina-
tion based upon power, not competition. Just as producers collude to
fix prices and obtain monopoly profits, so social groups sometimes
collude to obtain the advantages of monopoly control over markets.
To enjoy the advantages of monopoly, a social group must reduce
competition from others by excluding them from markets. In this
way, the more powerful social group can shift the cost of segregation
to its victims, and more costs besides, so that the victims of discrimi-
nation are worse off and the discriminators are better off.
To illustrate, recall the hypothetical example in which some blues
discriminate against greens, and perfect competition causes the dis-
criminatory blue workers to bear the cost of segregation. Now sup-
pose that discriminatory blue workers organize themselves and
acquire enough power to disrupt the workplace. The blues could use
this power to threaten employers who failed to discriminate against
greens. Faced with the power of the blues, employers might find that
they could maximize their profits by avoiding disruption, even at the
cost of segregating workers and confining greens to lower level jobs.
This example describes circumstances in which segregation reduces
productivity and its victims bear the cost.
The consequences of discriminatory power ih the market for
skilled and unskilled labor are depicted in Figure 4. The demand for
skilled labor is indicated by the curve labelled Ds, and the supply of
skilled labor by greens, blues, and the sum of greens and blues, is
35. The empirical evidence is reviewed in FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 10, at
242-66. In the usual approach, "human capital" variables explain part of the wage-gap
between sexes or races, and the unexplained residual is attributed to discrimination. Gil-
lian Hadfield has suggested that the "human capital" variables should be viewed as re-
sults of discrimination in non-market institutions such as families and schools. See
Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the
Gender Gap, 82 GEo. L.J. 89 (1993).
36. Martin Katz argues that past discrimination could produce wage-disparities
between the races that are relatively permanent, in spite of high levels of competition.
These conclusions depend upon special assumptions such as barriers to entry. See Martin
J. Katz, The Economics of Discrimination. The Three Fallacies of Croson, 100 YALE
L.J. 1033 (1991).
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indicated by the curves S , S b, and S g+Sb, respectively. In the ab-
sence of discrimination, t e wage for all skilled workers equals ws.
The demand for unskilled labor is indicated by the curve labelled Du,
and the supply of unskilled labor (blue and green) is indicated by the
curve Su. In the absence of discrimination, the wage for unskilled
workers is wu.
Now consider how discrimination changes wages. If skilled blues
exclude skilled greens from the market for skilled labor, the supply
falls from Sg +Sb to Sb, and the skilled wage rises to w' s. Discrimina-
tion forces greens to work as unskilled labor. The additional greens
entering the unskilled labor market swell the supply from Su to S' u,
which causes wages to fall from wu to w'u. Thus, discrimination in-
creases wages for skilled blue workers, and lowers wages for un-
skilled blues and all greens.
Fig 4: Discriminatory Power
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Discrimination as depicted in Figure 4 divides blues against each
other by increasing the wage of skilled blues and decreasing the
wage of unskilled blues. However, the unskilled blues could also use
discrimination to their advantage if they obtained power in the mar-
ket for unskilled labor. For example, unskilled blues might distin-
guish the tasks of unskilled labor into two types, "blue work" and
"green work." If more greens seek unskilled work than blues, and if
demand is higher for "blue work" than for "green work", then segre-
gating tasks will cause the wage of unskilled blue workers to rise
above the wage of unskilled green workers.
This market analysis can be applied to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196437 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)."8 These laws prohibit employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age. In prac-
tice, most workers fall within its protection except for young white
males. Complaints of discrimination must be filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission which investigates them.
Thus, for example, a company that wrongfully denied a job to some-
one two years ago might be ordered to hire the person and pay com-
pensation equal to the difference between his current wage and the
higher wage in the better job for two years. In terms of Figure 4, a
skilled green worker who was forced to accept unskilled employment
could sue for the difference between ws and wu. The fact that the law
limited damages to back-pay discouraged lawyers from taking small
cases on a contingency fee, but their reluctance may be overcome by
revisions in Title VII in 1991"' that brought employment discrimina-
tion closer to tort law by broadening damages.40
37. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993).
38. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 1985
& Supp. 1993).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
40. My thanks to Drew Days and Pam Karlan for helping me get the facts right
about current law. Donohue's analysis of data on Title VII suits discloses a paradox that
developed with time. Employment discrimination against women and minorities almost
certainly declined between 1970 and 1989, yet filings of employment discrimination cases
increased over 20 times. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991). What
happened? Many of the original suits were brought against hiring practices that discrim-
inated against classes of people. For example, blacks were effectively prevented from
becoming firemen in Birmingham, Alabama. See Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance
Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil
Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 195 (1992). The success of these suits
and the abatement of discrimination for other reasons causes more minorities and women
to move into better jobs and more integrated work environments. This progress towards
equal opportunity greatly increased the possibility for a new wrong: discriminatory firings
or lay-offs. So a new tort was born, "wrongful discharge," which can be asserted under
Title VII or the ADEA by a person who is fired. As time passed, the character of Title
VII complaints changed from discriminatory hiring of classes to discriminatory firing of
individuals. Econometrics shows that a good predictor of the number of employment dis-
crimination suits against firms at any point in time is the number of their employees
protected under law and the state of the economy. The more protected employees and the
worse the state of the economy, the more challenges against layoffs as discriminatory.
Donohue III & Siegelman, supra.
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VII. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AS ANTITRUST
In general, a group with the power to reduce competition from
others can benefit itself, whether the group is defined by race, reli-
gion, gender, or industry. Discriminatory social groups are much like
cartels, and a discriminatory norm is analogous to a price-fixing
agreement. Thus, the analysis and attack upon discriminatory mar-
ket power can borrow much from monopoly theory and antitrust law.
I will develop this parallel.4 '
Cartels are unstable because each member can increase its profits
by defecting from the group. For example, the Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) tried to fix prices, but coun-
tries like Algeria secretly discounted oil in order to sell more of it.42
As a cartel becomes large, detecting and preventing such "cheating"
by members becomes harder. Without legal backing and formal en-
forcement of their agreements, large cartels like OPEC collapse.43
Similarly, social groups can exert power to increase their wages by
restricting competition in the labor market, but individuals can profit
from violating the restrictions. To illustrate by the example in Figure
4, individual blue workers who cease to support segregation actively
can enjoy the discriminatory wage w's and avoid the inconvenience,
expense, or danger of participating in industrial disruptions. In eco-
nomic jargon, individual blues have an incentive to "free ride" with
respect to discriminatory norms by withholding enforcement effort.
Furthermore, an employer can reduce his wage bill for skilled work-
ers by hiring greens, who would otherwise have to work at unskilled
jobs, and paying a wage more than w'u and less than ws . So the self-
interest of employers and blues as individuals does not prompt them
to sustain discriminatory norms. In general, sustaining discrimina-
tory norms requires the collusion of many people, which presupposes
sanctions to enforce the discriminatory norms. Informal sanctions
such as gossip, ostracism, and boycotts can operate spontaneously,
41. A similar analogy is between a discriminatory norm and a tariff. In some cir-
cumstances a country gains an advantage by imposing a tariff on the products of another
country, especially if the other country cannot retaliate by imposing its own tariffs. Simi-
larly, one ethnic group could gain an advantage by imposing a tariff on hiring people
from the other ethnic group. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Economics of Discrimination,
71 J. POL. ECON. 481 (1963).
42. Charles P. Alexander, The Humbling of OPEC, TIME, Feb. 7, 1983, at 42, 43.
43. The instability of cartels is a standard topic in the economic theory of monop-
oly. See, e.g., LESTER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE (1978).
especially when a culture stresses group solidarity.4' In the past,
many Americans used informal sanctions to punish individuals who
failed to keep the races separate or women "in their place." How-
ever, the informal sanctions were probably not enough to sustain seg-
regation without being buttressed by formal laws.45
Although cartels are inherently unstable, the U.S. antitrust frame-
work does not merely withhold enforcement from contracts to create
cartels. In addition, the original U.S. legislation, which was enacted
at the end of the nineteenth century, outlaws cartels and other "con-
spiracies against trade. '46 The courts have interpreted the law to
prohibit certain collusive practices ("per se prohibitions"), such as
retail price maintenance, regardless of whether collusion occurred in
fact.47 These prohibitions greatly increase the difficulty of sustaining
a cartel.48 Similarly, U.S. civil rights laws prohibit business practices
involving "disparate treatment" of those persons belonging to any
one or more protected classes. 49 The illegality of conducting certain
business transactions with the intent to discriminate greatly in-
creases the difficulties involved in explicit discrimination, especially
in large organizations.
Over the years, the effective scope of antitrust law expanded from
banning cartels to suppressing monopolies.50 A monopoly can arise
even without collusion or engaging in practices that are illegal per
se. For example, monopoly power can be "thrust upon" a producer
due to economies of scale in production. Such monopolies are evalu-
ated for their legality in the United States according to a balancing
test.51 The balancing test is intended to determine whether the sav-
ings in cost from scale economies outweigh the risk to the public of
having only one or two producers. Balancing tests have their own
history that I cannot discuss in detail, but a relevant episode is the
44. See George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-based Wages Among Tradi-
tion-oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265 (1985).
45. See Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 EcoN. INQUIRY 661 (1989).
46. Sherman Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1992).
47. See National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla.
1984).
48. There is a certain irony in the fact that large cartels are easiest for the govern-
ment to detect and prosecute, but large cartels also are the ones that tend to fall apart
even without government prosecution.
49. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 1981).
50. Section 2 of the Sherman Act bans monopolies. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV
1992). Judicial implementation of this section was slow. Sullivan says that "[m]odern
legal analysis of monopoly issues begins with the opinion by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America," which was decided in 1945. LAW-
RENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 39 (1977) (citing United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)).
51. A compact and lucid discussion of the balancing test is in National Bancard
Corp., 596 F. Supp. at 1256-68.
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rise and fall of the "structural approach. 52 In the 1970s, the anti-
trust authorities prosecuted some very large manufacturers with the
intention of restructuring whole industries in order to increase the
number of producers. However, this approach was deemed a failure
and abandoned in the 1980s for a variety of reasons. 53
Antidiscrimination law has a history with some similarity to anti-
trust law. 4 At first the government focused its prosecutorial efforts
upon explicitly discriminatory practices. In these cases, the plaintiff
had to prove the existence of disparate treatment by the employer.
In 1971, however, the law evolved further and the U.S. Supreme
Court developed the concept of "disparate impact. ' 5 A practice can
have an illegal disparate impact in the absence of discriminatory in-
tent. The illegality of the outcome is identified by a pattern sug-
gesting that a protected group has been unreasonably disadvantaged
by a business practice. Thus, the concept of disparate impact in an-
tidiscrimination law bears a certain resemblance to "monopoly struc-
ture" in antitrust law. Whether the courts and the political process
will deem the past twenty-three years of disparate impact analysis a
success or a failure remains to be seen.
When antitrust laws block cartels, the industry may try to circum-
vent the law through the help of regulators. For example, airlines are
52. For accounts of the "structural approach," see JOE S. BAIN, INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE: EIGHT NATIONS IN THE 1950s 134-54 (1966);
RICHARD E. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 17-37
(4th ed. 1977); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 81-150 (2d ed. 1980).
53. The abandonment of the structural approach to antitrust adjudication in the
1980s is sometimes called the "victory of the Chicago school." See, e.g., Andrew I. Gavil,
Teaching Antitrust Law in its Second Century: In Search of the Ultimate Antitrust
Casebook, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 189, 210 n.123 (1991) (book review). It is reflected in the
changes in the FTC's merger guidelines in 1982. FTC STATEMENT CONCERNING HORI-
ZONTAL MERGERS, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1113,200, at 20,901-06 (June
15, 1993). Another indication of change is successive editions of Scherer's book Indus-
trial Market Structure and Economic Performance. SCHERER, supra note 52. Also, the
ABA's Section of Antitrust Law has discussions on current developments in antitrust in
its volume on the annual meeting. See, e.g., Symposium, The State of Antitrust, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 81 (1992).
54. I have stressed the role of discrimination by a group in reducing competition
from others. Another possibility is that a firm with market power will use a trait like race
or sex to discriminate in pricing among consumers. The latter type of discrimination
would fall under the ban of the Federal Trade Act. More generally, Ian Ayres has sug-
gested that antitrust law could be used to attack discrimination as an "unfair or decep-
tive trade practice." Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 821 (1991).
55. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). An extensive discussion of
this development of the law is in chapter 10 of Epstein's book. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 10, at 182-204.
forbidden to collude in setting prices, but they had much influence
with the Civil Aeronautics Board and apparently used it to impose
the cartel price upon many routes.5 Similarly, southern whites ac-
tively used the power of state and local government to reduce compe-
tition from blacks through the "Jim Crow" legislation that was
enacted in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.E7
Antidiscrimination laws can also be used to benefit a social group
by reducing competition from others. To illustrate by Figure 4, sup-
pose the greens, who were the historic victims of discrimination in
our hypothetical example, acquire legislative power and enact laws
mandating preferential hiring of greens. For example, the law might
mandate filling job openings in various categories with greens until
sixty percent of the workers are green. (Perhaps sixty percent of the
population is green.) In job categories where the target binds, blues
cannot compete with greens for jobs, which causes the green wage to
rise above the blue wage for equivalent workers. These arguments
underlie the claim that affirmative action is reverse discrimination.
The phrase "rent seeking" refers to the efforts of people to secure
laws that convey monopoly power and profits upon themselves. A
standard prescription for preventing rent-seeking is to remove the is-
sue from ordinary politics by constitutionalizing it.58 For example,
constitutional guarantees of private property inhibit politically influ-
ential people from using the state to appropriate the property of
others for themselves. Similarly, constitutional guarantees against
discrimination can reduce rent-seeking by social groups. On the
other hand, the creation of vague and uncertain constitutional rights
by courts can unleash extensive rent-seeking through litigation.59
I have shown that social groups, including racial and ethnic
groups, are paradigmatic interest groups in many respects. Like
other interest groups, they seek to collude and redistribute wealth to
themselves by inefficient restrictions on competition. However, self-
interest and morality often prompt individuals to evade these restric-
tions. So discriminatory social groups suffer the same problems of
instability as any other cartel. To sustain discriminatory norms,
evaders must be punished by a combination of informal sanctions
and formal laws. By repealing these laws and undermining these
sanctions, law can cause the discriminatory norms to disintegrate.
Constitutional protection against discrimination, like constitutional
56. See Theodore E. Keeler, The Revolution in Airline Regulation, il CASE STUD-
IES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 53 (Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W.
Klass eds., 1981).
57. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 10, at 91-97.
58. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 31 (1985).
59. Regulatory takings as rent-seeking is a theme in Richard Epstein's book. Id.
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guarantees of property, can facilitate competition and preclude
wasteful efforts to redistribute income among social groups by politi-
cal means.
VIII. DISCRIMINATORY SIGNALS AND ASYMMETRICAL
INFORMATION
I first considered discrimination in the context of competition, and
then I considered market power. Now I consider a different kind of
market imperfection, specifically, imperfect information on the part
of buyers and sellers." To understand the problem of imperfect in-
formation, I begin with a familiar example concerning insurance
against automobile accidents. Insurance companies classify drivers
into broad groups and set premiums according to the probability that
the average driver will have an accident. For example, young drivers
cause more accidents on average than old drivers, and young males
cause more accidents on average than young females. The gender
and age of policy holders, which are cheap for insurance companies
to discover, predict the riskiness of drivers with sufficient accuracy to
be useful for setting insurance rates. So insurance companies charge
higher premiums for being young and male.
"Good signal" is the name economists give to a characteristic that
predicts accurately on average and is cheap to observe. In transac-
tions with imperfect information, the parties search for good signals
to reduce their uncertainty. Examples of good signals include the
smell of a peach, the weight of a football player, the megahertz of a
computer chip, the class rank of a law student, the rating of a bond,
and the brand name of an automobile.
Now I turn to signaling in labor markets. Just as insurance com-
panies know little about individual policy holders, so employers know
little about job applicants. In choosing among them, employers rely
upon signals to predict performance. For example, a job applicant
with a college degree can easily provide the employer with a copy of
his transcript. The college degree may signal traits like intelligence
that the employer values. Education effectively signals intelligence
because more intelligent people can acquire education more easily
and cheaply than less intelligent people. 1
The original models of job-market signaling concerned the "rat-
60. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN
LABOR MARKETS 3, 23-33 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
61. See A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN
HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 14-30 (1974).
race" that could arise when the signal had no intrinsic value. 2 For
example, suppose that certain employers value native intelligence but
not education. Students might over-invest in education, not to learn
anything useful, but merely to signal their intelligence ("credentials
race"). In the rat-race models, people over-invest in an observable
variable to signal a fixed trait.
Discriminatory signaling inverts the "rat-race" models. In discrim-
inatory signaling, a fixed trait like gender or race signals an unob-
served variable. To illustrate, men are physically stronger than
women on average, so some employers reject all female applicants
for jobs requiring strength. By adopting such policies, an employer
will often make mistakes like rejecting a strong woman and ac-
cepting a weak man, just as an automobile insurance company some-
times over-charges safe males and under-charges dangerous females.
If these mistakes cost less than gathering more individualized infor-
mation, the use of the signal maximizes profits, and competition will
reinforce the discriminatory practice. Conversely, if the cost of these
mistakes exceeds the cost of gathering more individualized informa-
tion, then the use of the signal is inefficient and competition will
eliminate it.
People cannot acquire a fixed trait. To illustrate, few people will
alter their race or sex in order to improve their job prospects, even
with modern surgery. Consequently, discriminatory signals cannot
produce a wasteful rat-race. Instead, sorting by traits can produce
the opposite effect: under-investment in human capital. If employers
attribute to each individual the average productivity of members of
the group having his traits, then the benefit of investments that in-
crease an individual's productivity will accrue in part to the group.
Consequently, each individual will have a tendency to under-invest
in acquiring productivity-increasing skills. The tendency to under-
invest may be strongest in groups that are the victims of
discrimination.6"
Although discriminatory signals can cause inefficiency, the usual
objection to them is that they are unfair. The unfairness consists in
judging individuals by averages. Suppose that government prohibits
employers from using certain signals. For example, a statute might
give strong women the right to sue employers who hire men exclu-
sively for jobs that require strength. If the prohibited signals are
inefficient, the law bans what competition will eliminate anyway. If
the prohibited signals are efficient, the law augments the cost of pro-
duction, which someone must bear. Competition drives the market
62. See George A. Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and
Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q.J. EcON. 599 (1976).
63. See Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am. EcoN.
REv. 228 (1986); see also Is Title VII Efficient?, supra note 12.
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price of a good down to the cost of producing it. Thus, a reduction in
an industry's efficiency typically causes the consumers of its products
to pay higher prices.
To illustrate, assume that gender efficiently signals the physical
strength of job applicants. If the law bans the use of this signal and
the prohibition is effective, rational employers will adopt the best
substitute for the banned signal. The best substitute may be a direct
measure of physical strength, or the best substitute may be another
signal, such as the applicant's height, weight, and age. In any case,
competition will pass the higher cost of sorting job applicants on to
consumers in the form of higher product prices. 4
Banning discriminatory signals is not usually the cheapest way to
undo their effects, because a ban forces employers to rely upon a
more costly substitute for every job applicant. To illustrate, assume
that gender efficiently signals strength, and a ban on its use compels
employers to test strength directly. The direct test will have to be
administered to every job applicant, including all the males, which
will increase costs significantly.
In the absence of regulations, the victims of discriminatory signals
may have private remedies. To illustrate by the preceding example,
if employers have no irrational prejudice against hiring women for
jobs requiring strength, but gender efficiently signals strength, then
strong women would probably find it in their interests to undergo
direct tests and provide employers with the results. Consequently,
selective use of direct testing would occur without government inter-
vention in the labor market.6 5
The objection to non-intervention in this example is that female
applicants would have to bear the cost of a test that men need not
64. Behind these remarks lies a complicated incidence theory developed in public
finance. For a survey, see RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 171-98 (2d ed. 1976).
65. Another solution to discriminatory signaling is inhibited by current antidis-
crimination laws. To see why, consider the case of the smart, lazy law student with medi-
ocre grades who becomes inflamed with ambition after graduation. To overcome the
signal given by his mediocre record, he offers to work for half pay for a year if a major
law firm will give him a chance. At the end of the year, the firm can either fire him or
retain him at the regular wage. Thus, the law student assumes the risk that his record
signals to prospective employers. Similarly, the victims of discriminatory signaling might
want to assume the employer's risk in order to be given a chance. For example, a female
lawyer might offer to work for lower wages for a year in order to demonstrate that she
can be just as effective as males. Title VII and the ADEA have created a tort of wrong-
ful discharge that members of the protected classes can assert against employers. The
existence of this tort greatly increases the risk to an employer who wants to give people
the chance to prove their worth.
take. Regulations would be required to overcome this objection. The
employer might be required to test directly the strength of any appli-
cant requesting it. Or the state might provide direct tests of strength
without charge. In general, the economic strategy for correcting dis-
criminatory signals is to increase the flow of information to the mar-
ket so that relying upon them is unnecessary. This approach usually
suggests a cheaper solution than banning the use of the discrimina-
tory signal. The savings in cost is obtained by augmenting the infor-
mation on potential victims of discrimination, without forcing the
gathering of more information on everyone.
Having discussed signaling in markets, I offer some remarks about
signaling in organizations. Most organizations contain a hierarchy of
roles, and the members compete to rise in the hierarchy. Competi-
tion for promotion is called an "internal labor market" because it is
so similar to competition for employment. An employee who works
long enough in an organization gets to know its people and practices,
which may enable him to produce more than he could in alternative
employment. Consequently, an employee's wage often exceeds what
he could earn in the next best employment. Organization-specific
knowledge ties the worker to the firm and the firm to the worker.
Instead of quitting, a disgruntled worker often complains. Assessing
the merit of such complaints is difficult because productivity is diffi-
cult to measure in organizations. Imperfect information about pro-
ductivity causes the same reliance upon signals in promoting as in
hiring. Consequently, the analysis of market signaling developed
above for job applicants also applies to promotions.
Many social critics believe that decision-makers frequently rely
upon false signals that reflect social stereotypes, not accurate aver-
ages. Competition can teach a sharp lesson to businesses that rely
upon false signals. Decision-makers whose prosperity depends upon
the accuracy of their perceptions are better situated than social crit-
ics or legislators to penetrate myths. However, competitive pressures
are blunted in many organizations, especially in the public sector or
the not-for-profit sector. This is where economic theory predicts that
false signals are most likely to persist.
IX. EXTERNALITIES AND TIPPING POINTS
When each person's action depends upon what others do, the in-
terdependency of behavior can create instabilities. To illustrate, if
each buffalo follows the one in front, the whole herd may run over
the cliff. Similarly, "white flight" can destabilize an integrated
school or neighborhood. In this section I analyze the instabilities cre-
ated by interdependent preferences towards mixed social groups.
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I begin with a simple model of white flight. 6 Assume that an all
white neighborhood consists of one hundred families who can be
ranked according to their attitudes towards residential integration.
At one end of the ranking, the one hundredth white family would
move out of the neighborhood if one black family moved in. Simi-
larly, the ninety-ninth family would move out if two black families
moved in. Proceeding down the ranking, the first family would move
out when ninety-nine black families had moved in.
I also assume that blacks have a continuous distribution of atti-
tudes towards living in neighborhoods with whites. Some black fami-
lies would be willing to move into an all-white neighborhood, many
black families would be willing to live in an integrated neighborhood,
and some black families would be unwilling to live in a neighborhood
with any whites.
Now assume that demand and supply in the housing market is
such that whenever a house becomes vacant in a particular white
neighborhood, more black families want to buy it than white fami-
lies. It is not hard to see that if one black family moves into the
white neighborhood, a process will be set in motion that may not end
until all whites have moved out. Specifically, if one black family
moves in, the one hundredth white family will move out. Now the
house of the one hundredth white family must be sold. The buyer of
the vacant house is more likely to be black than white, so it is likely
that two black families will now reside in the neighborhood. As a
result, the ninety-ninth white family will move out. Now it is likely
that there will be three black families in the neighborhood and the
ninety-eighth white family will move out. The process continues until
the neighborhood is all black.
The tragedy of this situation is that many of the whites in the
neighborhood may positively value residential integration, and many
of the blacks who move in may also value it. In spite of much posi-
tive sentiment favoring integration, it is unachievable by unrestricted
sales in a free market. Instead, the integrated neighborhood inexora-
bly unwinds and becomes segregated.
Notice that this model's dynamics make no particular assumptions
about the source of attitudes towards integration. For example, the
attitudes of whites or blacks in the model may reflect skin prejudice,
cultural pride, class consciousness, or fears about housing values.
The dynamics of the model are the same regardless of the attitudes
66. This model is based upon THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Sorting and Mixing: Race
and Sex, in MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135 (1978).
underlying expressed preferences towards residential integration.
The most familiar economic models compare equilibria ("compar-
ative statics"), whereas this model describes a dynamic path. Indeed,
this model probably describes the actual dynamic in American cities
after World War II when many neighborhoods went from all white
to all black. It also probably describes forces at work in many public
schools today. Since the model is unfamiliar and important, I will
develop it better with the help of a graph.
Figure 5 graphs the attitudes towards integration of residents in a
neighborhood that is all white. The horizontal axis in Figure 5 shows
the proportion of white residents in a neighborhood who plan to
move out. The vertical axis shows the proportion of black residents.
Thus, the graph shows the proportion of white residents who would
plan to move out as a function of the proportion of black residents
who move in.
To illustrate its interpretation, suppose that the graph consisted of
a single point at the northwest corner, corresponding to the value
(0%, 100%). This would indicate that no white family in the neigh-
borhood would plan to move out even if all the other residents were
black. Conversely, suppose that the graph consisted of a single point
at the southeast corner of the graph, corresponding to the point
(100%, 0%). This would indicate that all whites in the neighbor-
hood would plan to move out if only one percent of the neighborhood
became black. The curved line in Figure 5 represents a more realis-
tic case in which there is a continuous distribution of sentiment to-
wards integration. I will analyze the dynamics of white flight created
by the distribution of preferences represented by the curved line in
Figure 5.
As the curve in Figure 5 is constructed, one hundred percent of
the white residents would be willing to remain if less than twelve
percent of the residents were black. Thus, up to twelve percent of the
white families can move out and be replaced by blacks without pro-
voking white flight. However, once the proportion of black residents
reaches twelve percent, white flight begins, as can be seen by consid-
ering some points on the graph. Point A indicates that more than
twelve percent of the white residents would plan to move out if the
neighborhood were twelve percent black. This is an unstable situa-
tion in which integration starts to unwind. At point B, approximately
fifty percent of the white residents would be planning to move out if
twenty-five percent of the residents were black. At point C, seventy-
five percent of the whites would be planning to move out if fifty per-
cent of the residents were black. And so the flight goes on until no
whites remain in the neighborhood.
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To complete the model, another graph could be drawn showing the
distribution of black preferences towards integration. In this graph,
the vertical axis would show the proportion of whites in the neigh-
borhood, and the horizontal axis would show the proportion of blacks
who would be willing to move into the neighborhood. The model is
left incomplete for the sake of simplicity.
A neighborhood characterized by Figure 5 is one in which eighty-
eight percent or more whites is an unstable equilibrium, and zero
percent whites is the only stable equilibrium. The stability conditions
can be stated precisely in terms of the diagonal line in Figure 5. The
model assumes that whenever a house becomes vacant, it is more
likely to be purchased by a black than a white family. So long as the
neighborhood is at a point where the curved line representing white
attitudes towards integration lies below the diagonal line, more
whites plan to move out in response to the existing proportion of
black residents. This is a disequilibrium. There is an equilibrium at
any point where the curved line representing white attitudes towards
integration touches the diagonal line. To have a stable equilibrium,
the curved line must intersect the diagonal line from below.
Tragic Segregation
I will describe a neighborhood as "spontaneously integrated" if the
preferences of its residents can be graphed as a curve in Figure 5
that intersects the diagonal line from below. Otherwise, the neigh-
borhood spontaneously segregates, as depicted by the curved line in
Figure 5. Spontaneously segregated neighborhoods are like a tragic
drama in which social laws lead inexorably to an end that no one
wants. The outcome frustrates the desire of many people of both
races to live in an integrated community.
One way to avoid this tragedy is the use of racially restrictive cov-
enants ("ceiling quotas") to stabilize integration. To illustrate, if
fifty percent of the houses in the hypothetical neighborhood modelled
in Figure 5 had enforceable deeds restricting ownership to whites,
the neighborhood would have stabilized with fifty percent white fam-
ilies and fifty percent black families. Furthermore, the fifty percent
white families and the fifty percent black families in the neighbor-
hood would tend to be those with the most positive attitudes towards
integration. However, racially restrictive covenants, which were used
historically to keep blacks out rather than keeping whites in, have
been struck down by the federal courts.6 7
The continuing legal obstacles faced by ceiling quotas are illus-
trated by the example of Starrett City, which is a private housing
project in Brooklyn whose construction was partly financed by the
federal government.68 In 1987 the project had approximately 20,000
tenants, with whites occupying nearly sixty-five percent of the 5881
apartments, and the other thirty-five percent being occupied by
blacks and Hispanics. The managers had set a racial target of sixty-
five percent white and thirty-five percent nonwhite, which they de-
fended on the grounds that it was necessary to maintain a stable,
integrated community. There were, however, fewer white applicants
for vacant units than nonwhite applicants. The National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged these
targets in a suit brought in 1979. The settlement reached in 1984
stipulated that allocation by race should continue, but 174 additional
units should be made available to nonwhite applicants. This settle-
ment was subsequently challenged by the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department, which contended that any such system of
racial quotas, even one whose purpose is integration, violates the
67. In Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court found unconsti-
tutional a covenant in a deed prohibiting the sale of the property to Negroes.
68. See Leonard Buder, Race Quotas Voided at Brooklyn Housing Complex, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1987, at Al.
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Federal Fair Housing Act. The view of the Justice Department pre-
vailed in federal court which ordered an end to the racial quotas.6 9
The federal government position on Starrett City was to ban quo-
tas, regardless of the consequences for white flight. The opposite ap-
proach was recently taken by the school board for Des Moines,
Iowa.10 White flight allegedly began with implementation of a
"choice" program that permitted students to transfer from one
school to another. The school board responded by prohibiting trans-
fers by white students and continuing to allow transfers by all other
students. In effect, the school board sought to stabilize the existing
racial mix in each school by setting a quota of zero on white
transfers.
As these examples suggest, the law deals with racial mixing differ-
ently in neighborhoods and schools. Most neighborhoods consist of
privately owned residences, and most American children attend pub-
lic schools. Legal officials have tried to prevent discrimination in
sales or leasing of residences, without aiming at any particular out-
come with respect to residential integration. For schools, the courts
and administrators have often defined ideal patterns of racial mixing
and assigned students to schools in an effort to achieve these ideals.
Can economists devise a way to stem white flight other than rely-
ing upon targets? From the viewpoint of economic theory, white
flight is caused by an externality consisting in individual preferences
over the racial mix in neighborhoods or schools. Economists typically
propose to remedy externalities with tax-subsidies or transferable
rights. In principle, these remedies could be applied to racial mixing.
Thus, a tax might be assessed on housing sales that worsen a neigh-
borhood's racial mix, or a subsidy might be paid on housing sales
that improve the neighborhood's racial mix. Similar devices could be
developed for education, such as school vouchers that increase in
value when the enrollment of a pupil in a particular school improves
its racial balance.
Alternatively, a solution using transferable property rights might
69. A follow-up story reported that Starrett City was avoiding the effect of the
court order by not filling any vacant apartments from its waiting list of applicants who fit
the poverty criteria, black or white, but instead keeping them vacant until someone ap-
plied who was above the legal definition of poverty. The middle class applicants who were
above the poverty line were disproportionately black. Alan Finder, Starrett City Keeps
Apartments Vacant Despite Waiting List, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, § 1, at 1. A more
complete history is in Howard Husock, Subsidizing Discrimination at Starrett City,
CITY J., Winter 1992, at 48.
70. See Isabel Wilkerson, Des Moines Acts to Halt White Flight, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1992, at 9.
be developed. It might work like this: racially restrictive rights of
residence would be issued by the government to property owners in
participating neighborhoods. The distribution of rights would corre-
spond to the government's ideal racial mix for the neighborhood. To
sell a property in the neighborhood to a prospective buyer, the owner
would have to possess a right of residence corresponding to the pro-
spective buyer's race. For example, if the best prospective buyer of a
property were black, but the owner of it possessed a "white occu-
pancy right," the sale could not be consummated without buying a
"black occupancy right" from someone else.
A theoretical possibility, which I have not discussed, is that unreg-
ulated markets with negative externalities from mixing result in ex-
cessive integration relative to the efficient level. I simply note in
passing that taxes could also eliminate this inefficiency.
CONCLUSION
The economic theory of regulation suggests that some laws and
policies concerned with discrimination and affirmative action stifle
enterprise unnecessarily, so they should be repealed or reformed.
This paper develops the general lines of the argument for reform and
reaches the following conclusions: (i) competition causes discrimina-
tors to pay the cost of segregation, not the people discriminated
against; (ii) in competitive equilibrium there will be diversity among
organizations concerning diversity within organizations; (iii) social
groups that act like cartels can reduce competition, which benefits
themselves and harms others; (iv) the discriminatory power of social
groups can be attacked by forbidding practices motivated by dis-
criminatory intent, increasing competition with practices that have
disparate impact, and repealing laws that reduce competition among
social groups; (v) supplementing market information can often undo
the effects of discriminatory signals more cheaply than prohibiting
their use; and (vi) targets for the mixing of social groups, including
stemming white flight and integrating neighborhoods or schools, can
be achieved at least cost to the public by tax-subsidies or transfera-
ble rights.
Oscar Wilde once remarked that a cynic is someone who knows
the price of everything and the value of nothing.71 This aphorism
condemns economics to cynicism. However, knowing the price of
public policies is an essential step in deciding their value, even when
disagreements run as deep as religion. Current antidiscrimination
71. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDEMERE'S FAN Act 3 at 52-3 (Methuen Student Edi-
tions 1985) (1892). The character Cecil Graham asks "What is a cynic?" to which Lord
Darlington responds, "A man who knows the price of everything and the value of
nothing."
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laws impose various prohibitions upon economic transactions.
Prohibiting transactions rather than pricing them prevents the devel-
opment of a legal market, so the costs of the policy motivating the
prohibition remain unknown. Tax-subsidies, transferable rights, or
other forms of "market affirmative action" could partly solve this
problem and others. 2
If the disagreement over policy remained within the bounds of ec-
onomic science, disputants would respect the general framework of
the economic theory of regulation developed in this article. There is,
however, a decisive reason why this will not happen. Law condemns
practices by prohibiting them. Many people regard the public con-
demnation of discrimination as vitally important to social justice and
public education. Efficient remedies for discrimination do not pro-
hibit and condemn enough of it to satisfy its victims. To address
these concerns, economics needs a theory of the expressive and edu-
cative power of law. 3
The educative role of law is to change values by inducing people to
internalize norms. From an economic perspective, a norm becomes
"internalized" when disobeying it has a psychological cost to the in-
dividual. To illustrate, many people now refrain from smoking in
public places, even though the laws are seldom enforced formally.
Apparently, smoking ordinances have been internalized by many
smokers. Economics needs a predictive theory of internalization in
order to analyze the educative role of law in crucial areas such as
discrimination. 4
Market environmentalism originally had no place in federal legis-
lation. However, heavy moralism in environmental law eventually
yielded to a more pragmatic approach, one that acknowledges a
place for market-like instruments. Perhaps environmentalists could
take a more pragmatic approach because they could leave the con-
demnation of pollution to parents, schools, and intellectuals, rather
than the law. Like market environmentalism in 1970, market affirm-
ative action has no present, but it may have a future. A massive
72. Space has constrained me from saying much about the important problem of
protecting market affirmative action from political corruption. For an example of collec-
tive choice theory applied to discrimination, see Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991).
73. See generally MURRAY J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 44-72
(1964).
74. For the start to developing such a theory, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1, 23; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J.
LEG. STUD. 217 (1993).
change in attitudes and values has occurred in America concerning
discrimination and separation. These changes are proceeding inde-
pendently of law under the direction of parents, schools, churches,
and intellectuals. I suspect that these people and organizations are
more effective than law in inducing people to internalize new values.
If the opponents of discrimination and proponents of affirmative ac-
tion become more confident that their values are shared by most
Americans, perhaps they will become more pragmatic and critical
about the means of achieving their ends.
